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| 50th Anniversary of the NPT | |
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| Tweet Topic Started: Dec 18 2017, 06:06 PM (1,024 Views) | |
| Gabe | Dec 18 2017, 06:06 PM Post #1 |
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Secretary of State As the world approaches the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I would like to invite the world's nuclear powers for talks in Seattle, Washington to discuss our obligations under the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. The second pillar of the Treaty is disarmament, yet across all of the nuclear powers, more money is being invested in the development and production of nuclear weapons than is often being spent on foreign aid and development. I would hope for positive and practical talks, free from finger pointing and needless hostile language. In recent years the world has seen the agreement between the P5+1 to reach an agreement with Iran over its alleged nuclear program. We have a duty to set an example to aspirant nuclear states, and to the international community as a whole, that we take our obligations seriously. The New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation should be lauded as a positive step, but I believe we must all go further. My own government will be making a pledge to reduce our nuclear stockpile at these talks, and I would urge those attending to consider their own stockpiles and discuss ideas for reductions. 50 years ago, on 1 July 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature. The treaty recognized five states as nuclear-weapon states: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the Republic of China (then succeeded by the Peoples Republic of China). Since then, India, Pakistan and North Korea have joined the nuclear powers, and there are rumours about an additional country, but this is not the place for discussion on that matter. Nuclear weapons undoubtedly pose the gravest threat to security. The talk of 'global terrorist networks' is a pin prick compared to the implications of an accidental launch, a mistake in handling or a deliberate use of such weapons. There are too many weapons held around the world, and action must be taken. Article VI of the NPT declares that "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament." This has been interpreted by the International Court of Justice as meaning that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Looking around the world, this just isn't the case. Only the United Kingdom looks set to reduce its stockpile, with other nations either maintaining existing levels or seeking to expand their arsenals. Following the removal of President Trump from office, President Pence has ordered a full review of the United States nuclear program, a review which will look to reduce the number of warheads needed to safely provide the United States and it's allies with a credible nuclear deterrent, and we would like to call on all other nuclear powers to come here and sit down to discuss where reductions can be made in the worlds nuclear stockpiles. Edited by Gabe, Dec 18 2017, 06:06 PM.
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| Gabe | Dec 20 2017, 08:03 PM Post #21 |
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Secretary of State The definition of SSGN's as vessels carrying over 50 cruise missiles is something the United States can agree to. |
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| Vonar Roberts | Dec 20 2017, 08:03 PM Post #22 |
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Foreign Minister Wang Yi Let me first start by saying we welcome these talks with open arms, and seek a comprehensive soltuion to the reduction of the world's nuclear aresonel. China strongly disagrees with India's statement that China and Pakistan should be considered equilvent in the same terms as the members of NATO. China and Paksitan have never conducted the level of cooperation that NATO has in nuclear sharing, nuclear exercises, or nuclear policy. Minister Swaraj, The Indian position also strikes me as quite hypocritical. Correct me if I'm wrong but India maintaining a nuclear deterrence equal to China, which is according to our own intelligence estimates is at least three to four times that and some change of India's current nuclear stockpile would mean that if China was to cut it's stockpile to the proposed figured India would respond by building new nuclear weapons to add to it's inventory instead of reducing it's nuclear stockpile like the other responsible great powers have agreed to do. If this is the case China would give up almost 65% of it's established nuclear arsenal and India would build more nuclear weapons. This defeats the purpose of these arms reduction talks and would not be accepted by the Chinese government on principle. As for the subject of the SSBN and SSGN The People's Republic of China has plans for at least 6 SSBN's and a similar number of SSGN's. While we are not opposed to the broad stroaks of the agreement we would like to see a larger allotment of non-nuclear SSGN's to China than 4. As far as India's security concerns The Indian position is even more egregious when you consider the fact that for the last 44 year's India has never maintained a round-the-clock 24/7 365 deploy-able sea-based nuclear deterrence, and at a time when the other responsible nuclear powers are demilitarizing and are willing to in good faith make big cuts to their own nuclear stockpiles India wishes to build more nukes and more Boomers under the colorful nationalistic catch-phrase "equality with China." If India wishes for "Equality with China" it's true numbers should be 0 SSBN's, 0 SSGN's, 0 Nuclear capable bombers, and less than 40 nuclear weapons. Such terms would be "equal" on paper and in reality to what China is giving up with little argument in the name of international peace and stability. However it is our hope we can reaching a compromise that will assure India of it's inflated and unfounded in our opinion security concerns. We are willing to immediately retire our Xia Class SSBN submarine, and convert one of our Type 094 Jin-Class submarines to a SSGN specification. This will when coupled with India's land-based nuclear weapons result in paper parity with India as Chinese SSBN's only deploy 12 warheads at the moment, not 24 like American and Russian Boomers at least until the first Type 096 SSBN is deployed which will not be for several years and if a increase in the number of SSGN's for China is authorized we would not be opposed to the authorized Indian SSBN fleet being increased to two boats even though that would mean India would build one more SSBN. We are also willing to include in the treaty a agreement to limit future SSBN's to 16 or 18 missiles, and no more than 8 MIRV's with 500 kt yield limits for nuclear warheads on missiles. We also have concerns about the proliferation of Anti Ballistic missile Technology and it's ability to impede the ability of country's to rely on nuclear deterrence. With that in mind I would like to request the removal of the whole THAAD system or at the very least the very long range sensors from South Korea, as well as a agreement from the United States to not supply or build new land-based Anti Ballistic missile Technologies in Asia. Edited by Vonar Roberts, Dec 31 2017, 09:31 AM.
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| Mogg | Dec 21 2017, 03:19 AM Post #23 |
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Joseph Chamberlain | Secretary of State for the Colonies
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Boris Johnson Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs While it is reassuring to see so much commitment to the cause of nuclear reduction, I'm dismayed by some aspects of Minister Wang's comments. India may not have implemented a continuous at sea deterrence policy, but neither has China, so if India is to forgo this capability on that basis, why does your country need 6 SSBNs? The upper limits imposed by this proposed treaty should be considered exactly that; an upper limit, not a target. A speed limit is not the recommended speed for a stretch of road, it is a maximum. If states are serious about nuclear disarmament and meeting their treaty obligations, then you would accept these limitations without hesitation. As I outlined earlier, my government will be reducing our stocks to around 70 warheads within a decade, 50% lower than even this treaty allows for. This is sufficient for a minimal credible deterrent, which should be the cornerstone of nuclear strategy for all nations who are determined to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In addition, these weapons are not on alert status and they are not targeted while stored, and we would urge all nuclear states to implement these policies to ensure that in the pressurised situation of a nuclear alert, missiles aren't launched on warning mistakenly, and also that malfunctions or accidental launches do not carry missiles to targets. I am also confused by the Chinese proposal for SSBN limitations. An SSBN with 16 missiles and 8 warheads is 108 warheads in total, so two Chinese submarines could never be at sea at any one time during a changeover of patrol, as you would be above your 150 warhead (not missile) limit and in violation of the proposed treaty by even possessing so many warheads. We would instead propose a three warhead limit; this is a policy adopted by the Royal Navy. If the United States can de-MIRV its entire ICBM fleet, it should be hard to argue that reducing the number of warheads from 8 to 3 is unfair on any one party. Regarding your concerns over ABM technology, this in no way undermines your current position as no systems that have been exported can intercept an ICBM. It is also worth noting that ABM proliferation is a cause and effect issue. If countries develop and export offensive ballistic missile technology, you cannot complain when your neighbours or adversaries deploy ABMs in response. Chinese ballistic missiles can be found in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, while we are always hearing how capable and threatening your short, medium and intermediate range missiles are. It is also worth noting that your own country has been developing ABM technologies of its own, so is this a principled stand against ABMs or an attempt to divert attention away from the nuclear weapons issue. Edited by Mogg, Dec 21 2017, 03:19 AM.
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| Redbirdfan | Dec 21 2017, 04:53 AM Post #24 |
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Bundesrepublik Deutschland
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Minister Tariq Fatemi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan As our wish has been agreed to, with recognition of Pakistan as a legitimate and legal nuclear power, we will agree to the terms. In the spirit of non-proliferation and a goal of reduction, we see no need to bargain or demand for increased allotments. |
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| Gabe | Dec 24 2017, 05:41 PM Post #25 |
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Secretary of State Minister Yi, While we're somewhat disappointed in the rather petty demands that China have some sort of superiority over India despite this agreement already effectively guaranteeing this fact remain true we have spoken to the other members of these talks and believe that it would be agreeable that China is allocated an additional 2 SSGN slots in this agreement. This would grant China 50 more nuclear warheads, 25 more long range ballistic missiles, 4 more SSGN's and 100 more long range bombers than India which I think all can agree would be considered superior in numbers and capability. In regards to ABM technology we stand in complete agreement with our British counterpart, and we remain steadfast in our stance that ABM issues should be dealt with in separate talks outside of these nuclear talks. As for MIRV restrictions we believe that a limit of 4 nuclear MIRV's per missiles is agreeable as has been suggested by myself and Minister Lavrov earlier along with a limit of a 500 kiloton yield per warhead. |
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| Vonar Roberts | Dec 26 2017, 09:22 PM Post #26 |
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Foreign Minister Wang Yi The People's Republic of China is largely agreeable to the modified proposals outlined by the United States, but we do have some remaining concerns about the MIRV numbers as proposed. Under this agreement we would accept for security purposes 4 or 5 nuclear capable SSBN's, and 6 non-nuclear capable SSGN's. On the subject of MIRV's I understand the JL-3 can launch 5-7 MIRV's depending on load out, The US-British Trident system fields 12 MIRV's, and the Russian Bulava system fields a currently unknown but likely similar number of MIRV's so I would recommend 8 MIRV's including decoy's as a solid number so that way no one country has to redesign their entire submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) inventory from scratch to be treaty compliant and only has to make minor alterations to new production missiles replacing existing stockpiles. Also contrary to the British statement China has long maintained a 5-SSBN fleet, giving us the ability to conduct a continuous at-sea deterrence policy if we so choose. Unfortunately the matter of the proliferation of anti ballistic missile technology is a matter of grave concern to my government. The United States recently deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Republic of Korea in response to North Korean missile concerns, as well as helped develop and deploy AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan. This proliferation of applicable anti ballistic missile (ABM) technology while understandable to a degree also makes it more likely that future higher-end anti ballistic missile (ABM) systems could be deployed to Korea, Japan, and elsewhere. Systems that could be used to undermine China's own security and nuclear deterrence. We will need some kind of assurances that such systems will not continue to proliferate or at least their proliferation of systems like the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system will not be deployed to Asia. |
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| Gabe | Dec 26 2017, 11:12 PM Post #27 |
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Secretary of State The proposed limit of 4 MIRV's is only in regards to the number of nuclear tipped MIRV's per missile, it does not limit the number of decoy or inert MIRV's that could be fired on each missile. With regards to the matter of ABM technology the United States will yet again, for the third or more time, make very clear that we have no interest in discussing ABM technology in these talks. It is a complete non starter and all other nations in these talks have agreed that the issue should be handled separately. As previously mention by Secretary Johnson, ABM proliferation is a cause and effect issue. If it were not for the continued advancement and proliferation of ballistic missiles by the likes of China the United States would not need to take such drastic steps in increasing it's ABM abilities. At the current time however I can say there are no plans to export or stage the GMD system in Asia due to costs, technological constraints, and simple effectiveness. |
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| Acer | Dec 28 2017, 08:53 AM Post #28 |
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Jean-Yves Le Drian Ministre de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères As of the last table presented by Secretary Tillerson, France is in support of this proposal and applauds the United States for taking such a pro-active lead in these negotiations. In addition, it is truly heartening to see so many nations come together. On the matter of MIRV's, we would support a limit of a maximum of 8 total with a further cap of 4 nuclear. |
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| winisle | Dec 28 2017, 10:32 AM Post #29 |
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Sergey Lavrov Minister of Foreign Affairs Russia will not entertain any discussions on re-entry aids, which basically an unarmed MIRV is. We are committed to a limit of 4 warheads maximum per missile, but if said missile also carries 4, or 8 unarmed MIRV's as re-entry aids, then that is just what it is. |
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| Vonar Roberts | Dec 31 2017, 04:37 PM Post #30 |
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Wang Yi Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China After clarification on the matter of MIRV's and decoy's we are agreeable for the most part. We would ask that MRBM's that are for the most part conventionally armed be not included in the proposed limitation of IRBM/ICBM/SLBM as they offer limited utility for the deployment of nuclear weapons, and we would agree on the numbers of IRBM, ICBM, and SLBM only if MRBM's are not included in the list. Instead of restrictions on numbers of MRBM's that can be built I would instead propose that we have a universal agreement for the country's who have signed the agreement to never deploy nuclear warheads on MRBM's. |
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