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Japan’s obsession with restarting Ohi reactors lacks “scientific basis”
Topic Started: 4 Jun 2012, 12:29 AM (57 Views)
skibboy
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Japan’s obsession with restarting Ohi reactors lacks “scientific basis”

3
JUN
2012

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The explosions that destroyed the reactor buildings at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant renewed concerns for the safety of the nuclear industry that were echoed by governments around the world.

The Japanese government is anxious to restart two Ohi reactors in Fukui, despite not addressing the exposed nuclear-safety flaws after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.

Behind the Ohi restarts in Japan is the central government’s pressure and lobbying by Kepco and the Kansai Economic Federation, headed by Kepco Chairman Shosuke Mori.

It even appears that the government intentionally worked out looser standards so that utilities can meet them in order to hasten the reactivation of Ohi nuclear plant’s idled reactors.

The government should be criticized for having moved too hastily and in a sloppy manner when it set new standards for deciding whether to reactivate nuclear reactors, even though the criteria are crucial in ensuring the safety of the public.

If the central government decides to restart the Ohi reactors, it will be a decision made in the absence of a solid foundation to ensure the safety of nuclear power generation.

The government claims that the new safety standards, which were drafted in a mere 48 hours to address residents’ worries, are based on knowledge and lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear disaster, but it is hardly convincing.

The government has not yet got to the bottom of the accident, and the standards appear to contain nothing new, and in fact, closely resembled a proposal by Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA).

Kansai Electric Power Co. submitted its safety plans in response to the government request for two reactors, adding that the full upgrades would take years to complete.

In other words, the new standards were worked out by only putting together emergency safety measures and the results of safety assessments that power suppliers have already implemented, giving the utility firms an excuse for putting off time-consuming safety measures.

The legal framework, including guidelines on quake resistance standards, disaster prevention and evacuation standards, has also changed very little since last March.

Japanese municipalities hosting nuclear power stations have urged Nuclear Crisis Minister Goshi Hosono to expedite the planned launch of a new regulating body.

The sole “scientific basis” for restarting the Ohi reactors is the results of a stress test.

But a stress test is, after all, a computer simulation whose results can vary depending on the data fed into computers and the computer programs used.

Nuclear Safety Commission Chairman Haruki Madarame himself stated in February that stress tests could not be used to gauge the safety of nuclear power plants.

In short, no politicians want to take responsibility for making a concrete decision.

In addition, the data and programs used have not been disclosed and third-party checks are impossible.

Thus outside parties cannot determine whether the test is appropriate.

Stress tests are merely being used as an excuse for the central government and power companies to restart reactors.

The central government’s dangerous obsession with restarting the reactors is highlighted by the fact that it has not even worked out a road map to phase out nuclear power generation.

The Fukushima disaster has emphatically showed that regions once considered a safe distance from reactors are also at risk of contamination.

Science without history is just ignorance.

Since the 1950s, the nuclear industry has failed to address key issues, namely the issue of nuclear waste disposal and the risk of radiation exposure and contamination when something like Fukushima occurs.

At Fukushima Daiichi and elsewhere, critics say that safety problems have stemmed from a common source: a watchdog that is a member of the nuclear power village.

Transcripts of the meetings show members rarely challenged one another — in Japanese culture, embarrassing others publicly can be considered shameful.

Though it is charged with oversight, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency is part of the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry, the bureaucracy charged with promoting the use of nuclear power.

Over a long career, officials are often transferred repeatedly between oversight and promotion divisions, blurring the lines between supporting and policing the industry.

Many times, regulation has been reactive, not proactive. For example, in 2007, NISA’s committees began focusing on seismic dangers — but only after an earthquake in northwestern Japan caused radioactive leaks, a minor fire and wall cracks at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, another sprawling nuclear power complex run by TEPCO.

Industry is heavily involved elsewhere in Japan’s government.

At the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, which backs research and promotes Japan’s nuclear industry, one of the five commissioners is an adviser to TEPCO, while another is a former executive at the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry.

Japanese lawmakers broadly agree the country needs a more independent nuclear-safety regulator, power utilities that run nuclear plants have enjoyed direct access to regulators, but Japanese officials just can’t seem to agree on how to do it.

Today, both the regulators and TEPCO are widely perceived trying to avoid responsibility for the disaster, while making no change to the approach of relying heavily on utilities to do the right thing largely on their own, which has clearly failed.

In December 2010, for example, Japan’s Nuclear Safety Commission said the risk for a severe accident was “extremely low” at reactors like those in operation at Fukushima.

The question of how to prepare for those scenarios would be left to utilities, the commission said.

A 1992 policy guideline by the NSC also concluded core damage at one of Japan’s reactors severe enough to release radiation would be an event with a probability of once in 185 years.

So with such a limited risk of happening, the best policy, the guidelines say, is to leave emergency response planning to Tokyo electric and other plant operators.

Decisions are made based on the opinion of the more optimistic and forward-looking, while the opinions of the pessimistic and precautious are ignored.

No-one will admit it officially or openly; but when setting standards for future earthquakes, the main concerns relate to money (how much is it going to cost?) and public perception (what can be determined as accepted risk?).

There is no need to restart this last reactor in terms of Japanese energy needs.

The entire discussion is a political one.

The locals should keep fighting and they might just win a nuclear free Japan.

Source: The Japan Times
Edited by skibboy, 4 Jun 2012, 12:37 AM.
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