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| Nietzsche vs Kierkegaard; Really damned huge. | |
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| Tweet Topic Started: Jan 9 2007, 12:18 PM (847 Views) | |
| Tabris Macbeth | Jan 9 2007, 12:18 PM Post #1 |
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The Baddest Ass
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I snagged this from Space is a Waste a long time ago. Originally written by Post, this is- in the words of Simon Templeman- a lot of bloody text: "Western Society's philosophical history has long been conflicted between the exact fundamental natures of existence; such as whether human beings are defined by a universality of ethics and virtues or if every individual's subjective morals are sufficient grounds for governing and affecting the world by. On one hand, there may exist an 'absolute' truth according to which all concepts of 'good' and 'bad' are legitimately scaled to. On the other hand, 'truth' may only be definable through a simple adherence to its concept regardless of its ultimate legitimacy or lack thereof. The debate rages over whether or not the nature of existence can be judged based on internal perception of the individual or through the external support of a religion, code, or deity. There is the argument that all religious and spiritual standards for morality are superficial due to having been mechanistically determined by generations upon generations of philosophical societies establishing and indoctrinating their preferred theology. There is also the argument that one's individual perspective is incapable of grasping all factors of an ethical universe from a finite standpoint and thus one must surrender oneself to faith in a higher entity possessing absolute, omniscient clarity—regardless of the ambiguity of such an entity's nature. These philosophical dialects have so refined western thought throughout the years that modern schools of philosophy—such as existentialism—now hold a valued emphasis on the power of subjectivity. Jean-Paul Sarte's notable belief that 'existence precedes essence' supports the now-prevalent notion that it is—indeed—the individual who is ultimately responsible for the values, morals, and ethics that will serve to be important in her or his life, for one simply cannot account for anything beyond that which is certain through the revelations of one's singular experiences in living. To reach this modern day conception of the importance of the individual's subjectivity, philosophical theory has refined itself through the writings of crucial thinkers, each of whom differ to some extent in detailing the nature of subjectivity but gradually—in chronological fashion—wither down the extent to which the individual's teleological importance is determined by external imperatives. Two writers on this philosophical chain of evolving thought—Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard—stand out not only because of their relative genius but simultaneously for their blatant contrasts. Nietzsche goes about detailing the 'new horizons' and promising potential of subjective intellectualism by historically deconstructing any and all notions of religious, sectarian morality imposed upon those in society who stand the most to gain from individualistic progression. Kierkegaard underlines the importance of a subjective approach to existence but at the same time maintains that happiness and advancement in living cannot be acquired by the individual alone—but instead personally through a relationship between the said individual and an omnipotent Absolute. Both thinkers understand the notions of fear, chaos, and confusion that can confront a person upon embracing the solitary isolation of taking a purely subjective position in life, and in spite of perceivable bleakness both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard write to establish a positive optimism that can serve new guideposts for those venturing into the philosophical unknown. In his book The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche illustrates a beautifully frank portrait of the superficial world (as he sees it) and how in the wake of pessimistic grand narratives individuals can call upon themselves to exercise proactive intellectualism in sharp defiance of the moralistic and societal impediments that have long weighed down generations previous. The world Nietzsche underlines is seemingly dark and depressing; it is a world where God has died and all of western society has to cope with the reality of imminent chaos and that everything that has ever been ritualistically believed over the last couple of millennia has been nothing more than canonically established lies. But where many thinkers might find hopeless despair in such a situation, Nietzsche rejoices, for he believes that while it is a painful thing to accept the shadow of the dead God for societal misunderstandings on a large scale, he maintains that it has been a far more painful thing for human civilization to function under the false pretense of God and sectarian doctrine for so many millennia to begin with—and now mankind is more free to live for himself now than ever before. The will of human beings under the grand narratives of the past had long been reduced to that of just the 'will to survive', but now in all gaiety and optimism for the intellectual future Nietzsche proposes that humans rightfully take advantage of their 'will to power' and extend themselves beyond the philosophical limits always imposed upon them. Nietzschean subjectivity of the individual, then, represents a springboard into realms of exploration and personal discovery. In understanding the grounds supporting Nietzsche's call to subjectivity, one must first grasp his statement in The Gay Science that "God is dead" (Nietzsche 167). Indeed, this is perhaps the most popular statement that Nietzsche has ever written, but its relevance goes beyond that of superficial shock value. The nature of God (in fact of all spiritual deities and essences) in Nietzsche's eyes is that of a social construct. The only reason God has died is because human beings—finite and mortal entities themselves—created Him in the first place. Humans thus hold an inescapable responsibility for dealing with the death of their Absolute source of ethical and moral value. In Section 125 of Book Three of The Gay Science, Nietzsche illustrates a parable of the 'madman' who runs in on a place full of commonfolk, screaming in hysterical horror that "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him" (181). After this terrific exclamation, the madman in the parable asks the people around him if they'd be capable of 'wiping their knives clean' and 'cleansing themselves' for having committed such an awesome murder. When the people give him no response but blatant silence, the madman—disappointed and ashamed—resigns: "'I have come too early'" (182). Indeed, at the time that The Gay Science is written, Nietzsche's society is far too panic-stricken to grasp the death of God, far too egoistic to bury God, and indeed they are blind to the fact that in respect to God's perishing "we still have to vanquish his shadow" (167). The reason for this inability to cope (or at least quickly cope) with the death of God is that the illusion of God has coincided throughout the last few thousand years with concepts of morality that have been hardwired into the brains of innumerable individuals. Theologians—including but not limited to supporters/followers of Greek Platonism, Jewish morality, and Christian fundamentalism—have maintained a societal standard that is anything but liberating or freeing to the singular soul: "All preachers of morals as well as all theologians share one bad habit; all of them try to con men into believing that they are in a very bad way and need some ultimate, hard, radical cure…Now they are only too ready to sigh, to find nothing good in life and to sulk together" (Nietzsche 256). The idea of God—juxtaposed with the idea of righteous morals—is just one of many ways that western society has infected itself with an oddly innate need to repress, withhold, and vilify individualistic impulse. This is the way in which sectarian society maintains what Nietzsche calls the 'herd instinct'; a literal transformation of human kind from respective individuals to ritualized mechanizations, where actions are governed and reinforced in accordance with an abstract, illusory dogma that works to invent and label 'good' and 'bad' moral standards: "Morality trains the individual to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function" (Nietzsche 174). When a person is reduced to a function, one calls into question the legitimacy of her or his 'free will'. Indeed, there is not even a truly unique 'conscience' to be found when the individual is made to ascribe to the herd instinct of a society's theological imperative. "In short, there are a hundred ways in which you can listen to your conscience. But that you take this or that judgment for the voice of conscience—in other words, that you feel something to be right—may be due to the fact that you have never thought much about yourself and simply have accepted blindly that what you had been told ever since your childhood was right…" (Nietzsche 264) Human beings aren't naturally machines or dumb organisms. Everyone has the potential for individualism and subjective reasoning, but it is the ideological establishment of mutual consciousness that limits the potential of each human being to exercise her or his potential: "Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be" (299). Without an applicably unique conscience or faith, the most that an individual is exercising is that of survival. There is no evolution beyond the constraints of one's psychological and social environment. There is no growth of the individual, no advancement of personal intellect or ethics, and finally no foundation upon which the person may truly take advantage of the open horizons of philosophical exploration lying before her or him: "The struggle for existence is only an exception, a temporary restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around power—in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life" (292). Beyond the will of life is the 'will to power' (as in intellectual, philosophical, and knowledgeable power of acquisition and extension), which above all else is the ultimate telos for the subjective Nietzschean individual. The 'will to power' may indeed be a selfish prospect if perfectly, radically pursued by each individual, but the extension of personal creed into the universal spectrum is no less an act of selfishness—in fact it is a mutually binding selfishness: "For it is selfish to experience one's own judgment as a universal law; and this selfishness is blind, petty, and frugal because it betrays that you have not yet discovered yourself nor created for yourself an ideal of your own, your very own—for that could never be somebody else's and much less that of all…" (265). Humans are meant to act as individuals—not as herding animals; or at least Nietzsche maintains that by breaking free from the conscience imposed upon oneself by the herd instinct, a person can finally come to a point of embracing intellectual freedom through subjective impulse into philosophical exploration of the unknown that has been left behind in the wake of God's 'death'. The revolutionary step of breaking out from under the buckles of theological repression is something that will most likely come as easy for the 'Good Europeans' of Nietzsche's culture, for there is a faith in individualistic prowess that has driven Europeans beyond the historical annals of Christiandom to explore, criticize, analyze, and grow into newer and sharper personalities. Nietzsche writes about the advent of philosophical subjectivity among the European populace as someone witnessing history in the making—as opposed to a rebel rouser preaching for such a change: "I welcome all signs that a more virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore honor to courage above all….the age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas and their consequences" (Nietzsche 228). With vigor and optimism, Nietzsche welcomes this 'godless age' for its liberation of philosophical aspirations: "Indeed, we philosophers and 'free spirits' feel, when we hear the news that 'the old god is dead,' as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again…" (280). The time has come for the individual to no longer be governed moralistically by external forces, but by the internal, subjective will to power that will cover the actions of each particular individual respectively: "Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and valuations and to the creation of our own new tables of what is good, and let us stop brooding about the 'moral value of our actions'" (265 – 266). The subjective approach to existence is that of self-evaluation and action, but it is also a grand experiment in the unknown—and Nietzsche knows that. He also knows that an individualistic approach to existence is something plagued by loneliness (175) as well as eternal chaos (168), but regardless of such he denies that there should be any despair over the apparent 'accident' of life, for "Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident; for it is only beside a world of purposes that the word 'accident' has meaning" (168). In a lot of ways, humankind's subjective philosophy is a science that everyone has been destined to experiment with from the start—for an approach to life that is unfettered by grand narratives and theological dogmas gives every individual a chance to freely uncover the natural 'will to power' within her or himself: "We, however, want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that end we must become the best learners and discovers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense—while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it. Therefore long life physics! And even more so that which compels us to turn to physics—our honesty!" (Nietzsche 266) Nietzschean subjectivity is a science; a gay science, for a person's will to intellectual and philosophical power is acquired best through a life lived 'dangerously' (228), 'gaily' (255), and with the daily rejuvenation of personal epiphany; comparable to a "sun that shines especially for him and bestows warmth, blessings, and fertility on him…it re-fashions evil into good…" (231). The fundamental level to a human being's existence for Friedrich Nietzsche—as outlined in The Gay Science—is a standpoint within a world where God is dead upon which an individual becomes willing not only to accept the death of God but to bury along with Him all ideological dogmas connected to the existence of the illusory being, so that in place of the deceased Absolute and His shadow there can be grasped a will to philosophical discovery and intellectual power obtainable only through a subjective exercise of one's own morality and belief system as defined through personal actions and adherence to an internal conscience that is not constructed or manufactured by an external herd instinct or a social grand narrative on the whole. The steps towards reaching this level of existence is recognizing—through a historical perspective akin to Nietzsche's—that every human individual (including every 'Good European' who is especially geared towards subjective thought) is capable of breaking free of dogmatic stigmas so as to instead 'embark' upon life with a uniqueness that grants every him or her a philosophical vigor when it comes to discovering for oneself what revelations, knowledge, and realities that this chaotic, godless world has to offer. As such, the individual that Nietzsche's writing appeals to is the 'yet-undefined animal', for although Nietzsche provides an extensive, historical foundation of deconstructed ideology that serves as the springboard for subjective philosophy, he gives no real answer to the chaotic advent of a godless universe, nor does he promise one. In respect to philosophical theory, The Gay Science inspires every individual to embrace one's impulse and discover the fruits of joyous living on one's own—but with a significantly optimistic spirit of gaiety as opposed to the pessimistic renunciation so common to the ideologies that Nietzsche opposed for their reduction of the human will to power to a mere will to survive without the prospect of philosophical extension. Soren Kierkegaard's philosophy—as exemplified in his work Fear and Trembling—serves as a sharp contrast to the declarations of Friedrich Nietzsche; mainly because Kierkegaard is the most definitively 'Christian' writer among the philosophers highly valued by followers of modern day existentialism. Kierkegaard is by no means an existentialist by present day terms, and certainly his work has no atheistic overtones whatsoever. But where Kierkegaard crosses parallels with Nietzsche is in his incessant need to emphasize the individual and subjective importance of philosophical thought. In Kierkegaard's world, God is very much alive and He serves as a divine source of everything universal and personal in real life. Every person—no matter which she or he adheres to the more, religion or reason—is ultimately bound to advance through life upon her or his relationship to the Absolute (God). But such a relationship cannot be mutually explained, that is, only on subjective grounds can each individual come to a point of understanding over what it is that life entails or what it is that the individual must be ethically, morally, and rationally called to do. So while God is a dead source of imprisoning, dogmatic lies for Nietzsche, He (God) remains an important key to the individualistic understanding of existence for Kierkegaard—not so much in that the answers to life can be found in the sectarian belief in God, but rather that any and all answers must be processed through one's personal relationship and faith in God within the temporal realm of life as much as in the eternal. While Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling focuses on some key allegories and accounts of the ideological past, his work is by no means the same sort of historical analysis that Nietzsche provides in The Gay Science. Essentially, Kierkegaard provides a modern day analysis of individualistic faith without attempting to explain the historical origins of the said 'faith' itself: "Even if someone were able to transpose the whole content of faith into conceptual form, it does not follow that he has comprehended faith, comprehended how he entered into it or how it entered into him" (Kierkegaard 7). There is a lot of uncertainty in Fear and Trembling, but the one thing that is certain is the nature of the Kierkegaardian Absolute; chiefly, God. In fact, a godless universe—not to mention a world without eternal values—is very much appalling and unreasonable to Kierkegaard: "… if a vast, never appeased emptiness hid beneath everything…—how empty and devoid of consolation life would be! But precisely for that reason it is not so, and just as God created man and woman, so he created the hero and the poet or orator" (15). The 'hero' and the 'poet' are the two chief subjects of Fear and Trembling, in that the poet is Kierkegaard himself as a witness to the hero—who is the biblical Abraham. Abraham exemplifies the most ideal role model of one who experiences a relationship with God and—from such—practices faith towards the processing of ethical paradoxes that frequent the thin, rocky road of a virtuous life. Most importantly, Abraham serves as the embodiment of Kierkegaardian ideology that "…above all we should impress on our memory as an infallible rule that what God has revealed to us is incomparably more certain than anything else; and that we ought to submit to the Divine authority rather than to our own judgment even though the light of reason may seem to us to suggest…something opposite" (6). One who is in a true, respectful relationship to the Divine Absolute God must be willing to surrender to God's will through faith, even if it means the abandonment of one's personal perspective of reason or rationality. Kierkegaard sees Abraham faithfully adhering to God's will most significantly in his attempt to sacrifice his son Isaac on Mount Moriah, as written in the Judeo-Christian Bible. Abraham's act of sacrificing his son can be seen as two major things on the outside: 1) it is a horrible, murderous act on the part of the father to slay his own son and 2) it is a divinely righteous thing for Abraham to do in obeying God's direct will to sacrifice Isaac. There arises from this situation an important paradox. It is wrong for Abraham to slay Isaac because it is against the universal ethical statute of God that prohibits murder (even though the Ten Commandments aren't written down yet): "The ethical is the universal, and as such it is also the divine…The duty becomes duty by being traced back to God" (Kierkegaard 68). In a universal sense, the duty to God is maintained by not committing murder. But for Abraham—an individual—he has uniquely been given a direct commandment by God to slay Isaac in sacrifice. Kierkegaard additionally writes: "…but in the duty itself I do not enter into relation to God" (68), and this holds true in Abraham's case because—through his individualistically unique relationship to God--he has been given direct instruction to perform a divine act that goes against the universal ethical duty (that also 'springs forth' from God). As Fear and Trembling underlines: "Whether the single individual actually is undergoing a spiritual trial…only the single individual himself can decide" (79). For Abraham, he is most certainly undergoing a conflict, for as much as he is devoted to the universal ethical to spare Isaac's life, he is also supremely, Absolutely devoted to the Divine God to kill Isaac. But this conflict goes beyond a conflict of universal ethics and divine obedience—for in order to make any spiritual, intellectual, or productive advance in his existence, Abraham must make a decision that involves his subjective point of view on what's important, what's beloved, and what's possible or impossible in his temporal life, not so much in his eternal/spiritual outlook. This is the supreme test of the Kierkegaardian individual; an intimate and personal balance of resignation and faith. To illustrate his analysis of Abraham's act of faith—as well as to serve up an ideal blueprint for an individualistic approach towards existence—Kierkegaard draws up two models of virtuous living; that of the tragic hero or knight of infinite resignation, and that of the knight of faith. The knight of resignation and the knight of faith are both essentially the same individual human being—but existing at two sequential phases of progress within one's relationship to the Absolute. The knight of resignation is someone who has his eyes set on a virtuous goal, akin to a knight who seeks to court the hand of a lovely princess (Kierkegaard 42 – 44). The knight of resignation is secure in his goals, aspirations, and dreams so long as it remains a possibility. But when the knight runs into a barrier or an impossibility that makes such dreams irrevocably lost to fruition, the knight reconciles to himself that—indeed—such aspirations shall not come true within his lifetime because of the inherent impossibilities impeding his path, and as a result—to preserve the virtue and joy of the aspirations themselves—the knight extends such goals beyond the eternal (44 – 45). This is the movement of infinite resignation—and in Abraham's case, that would involve the slaying of Isaac followed by a personal reconciliation that the future kingdom of his descendants was never meant to be—or at least that God had chosen another avenue of achieving glory in punishment of something Abraham himself had done to deserve the extinguishing of his son's life. The courting knight accepts that the desired princess is beyond his possible betrothal, and thus he hopes that beyond the grave he can feel a joy somewhere spiritually equivalent to the idea of being coupled with the regal lady of his dreams. Both Abraham and the courting knight are both (at least initially, in Abraham's case) knights of resignation—tragic heroes—because they extend their hopes and dreams into the eternal upon facing the impossibility of their aspirations coming true. For them—in such a case—the realm of the eternal is far more assuring to their hopes than ever the immediate realm of the temporal. The act performed is essentially a sacrifice or a renunciation, as Kierkegaard writes concerning the courting knight who fails to win the hand of the princess: "The knight, however, makes this impossibility possible by expressing it spiritually, but he expresses it spiritually by renouncing it. The desire that would lead him out into actuality but has been stranded on impossibility is now turned inward, but it is not therefore lost, nor is it forgotten…But he needs no finite occasion for its growth…He is no longer finitely concerned about what the princess does, and precisely this proves that he has made the movement infinitely." (Kierkegaard 44) In essence, Abraham and the courting knight—in making a movement of infinite resignation—would be basically accepting defeat. They understand the implications of their challenges or conflicting ethical imperatives ahead of them, and for them to so much as assume that their aspirations can come true in spite of the immediate barriers is a total paradoxical absurdity. This is where Kierkegaard's writing becomes most inspiring, for he teaches that it is inherent within the paradoxical absurdity of faith that an individual achieves true victory and understanding. The movement of infinite resignation is merely the first movement that sets the grounds for the movement of faith: "Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has not made this movement does not have faith, for only in infinite resignation do I become conscious of my eternal validity, and only then can one speak of grasping existence by virtue of faith" (Kierkegaard 46). As Kierkegaard constantly reinforces, there exists a universal ethical (54) and a universal ethical duty (68) that all must adhere to in divine respect to God, the origin of such commanded duty. A paradox ensues upon the advent of faith, that suspends the single individual's relation to the Absolute in importance above the necessity of the universal ethical (54 – 56). Kierkegaard most aptly details this paradox in respect to how faith suspends the individual and her or his subjective relation to God above the universal: "The paradox of faith, then, is this: that the single individual is higher than the universal, that the single individual…determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal. The paradox may also be expressed in this way: that there is an absolute duty to God, for in this relationship of duty the individual relates himself as the single individual absolutely to the absolute." (Kierkegaard 70) Kierkegaard is careful to point out that the universal ethical is in no way 'invalidated' by this paradoxical emphasis on the individual-and-Absolute relationship (it would not be a paradox if both the universal ethical and relationship to Absolute weren't both simultaneously 'superior' to each other). Another important aspect of the 'paradox' is that while there is a suspension of the ultimate superiority of the universal ethical duty, there is also a suspension of the individual's telos in the temporal realm through faith in conjunction with one's infinite resignation in the spiritual or eternal realm: "…for the movement of faith must continually be made by virtue of the absurd, but yet in such a way… that one does not lose the finite but gains it whole and intact.…faith makes the opposite movements: after having made the movements of infinity, it makes the movements of finitude" (37, 38). An individual momentarily transcends the universal ethical on grounds of one's divine relationship to the absolute (God) so as to make the movement of faith from the eternal realm (a realm familiar to the knight of infinite resignation) into the temporal realm as the knight of faith. Under these grounds, the courting knight expects—absolutely in his finite, temporal immediacy—that he will have the princess' hand in marriage, however paradoxically it conflicts with the blatant impossibility of doing so. Abraham has a 'solitary hope' (22) that though he would be slaying His Son and obeying God's command, he would still—beyond a shadow of a doubt—win the life of his son Isaac as God promised him in the immediate, temporal reality of his finite realm, even in spite of the preposterous notion that slaying Isaac and preserving Isaac could happen simultaneously. This paradox is accepted on virtue of the absurd, and in spite of its impossible nature, it is the most exemplary movement any individual can make in Kierkegaard's eyes: "…it is great to give up one's desire, but it is greater to hold fast to it after having given it up; it is great to lay hold of the eternal, but it is greater to hold fast to the temporal after having given it up" (18). Essentially, one who is willing to accept God's promise through faith in the spectrum of temporal reality—as opposed to the eternal realm (which is the limit of the knight of infinite resignation)—she or he becomes the "greatest of all" for "expecting the impossible" (15). Becoming the knight of faith is a strictly personal, individualistic, and subjective experience of the person who experiences a direct relationship to the Absolute, God. The most immediate paradox for such an individual—as only she or he can attest to it—is the person's suspension of the telos from the eternal realm back into the temporal realm in such a manner that the individual's divine relationship to God—through faith—supercedes any universal ethical that in most circumstances would morally judge the actions performed by said individual. That is how Abraham can commit an act of mortal sin and yet be accomplishing God's will at the same time, and as such the same paradoxical divine act can be faithfully performed by other knights in the same fashion: "It is only by faith that one achieves any resemblance to Abraham, not by murder" (Kierkegaard 30, 31). The key to exercising this faith is what Kierkegaard labels the 'virtue of the absurd', which is "virtue of the fact that for God all things are possible…" (46). Essentially, while Nietzsche may preach that religion is dying, Kierkegaard humbly admits that religion is absurd, and when it comes to true understanding of what is required of an individual in terms of faith beyond reason only that individual alone through a subjective experience (a relationship to God, the Absolute) can come to any viable conclusion. There is a great deal of dreadfulness and anxiety in the Kierkegaardian model for philosophical individualism and subjectivity—hence the title of his work, Fear and Trembling. The absurdities and paradoxes that a knight of faith individually faces causes him great trepidation, challenges, and turmoil—even in spite of his divine relationship to the Absolute. For Kierkegaard, this turmoil is the ultimate test of the individual: "The knight of faith has simply and solely himself, and therein lies the dreadfulness. Most men live in adherence to an ethical obligation in such a way that they let each day have its cares, but then they never attain this passionate concentration, this intense consciousness…but the knight of faith is alone in everything…the knight of faith is constantly kept in tension…" (Kierkegaard 78 – 79). The personal, solitary quest of the knight of faith in encountering the complexities in God's world is—for Kierkegaard—a far nobler and righteous way of life than that of people who live solely by sectarian modes of theology: "The true knight of faith is always absolute isolation; the spurious knight is sectarian….But the knight of faith…is the paradox; he is the single individual, simply and solely the single individual without any connections and complications. This is the dreadfulness the sectarian weakling cannot endure" (79). Hence, one can argue that Kierkegaard's argument is in favor of the subjective individual's prowess above that of the religious 'herd', thus aligning Kierkegaard more with Nietzsche's individualistic way of thinking. However, unlike Nietzsche, Kierkegaard is utterly unable to shed the concept of a divine, Absolute purpose in life (as ordained by a Sacred Other). He does not believe whatsoever that God is dead, and perceivably the more contemporary views of existentialism—at least in the atheistic sense—would horrify him: "But what an unfathomable grief that no amount of time can chase away, no amount of time can cure—to know that it would be of no help if existence did everything!" (102). The fundamental level for Soren Kierkegaard in a human being's existence is exercising one's relationship to the Absolute God in such a fashion that—when called upon during instances of conflicting duty—the individual makes a movement of infinite resignation to accomplish what is right, and then makes a movement of faith for the manifestation of telos within the temporal realm by virtue of the absurd. The manner in which the individual reaches this level is by focusing on her or his unique, individualistic relationship to the Absolute, God. In a world where universal ethical duties and morals do exist, it takes one's oftentimes obscure relationship to a Divine Other to—however paradoxical the dilemma—make decisions and perform actions in faith of God's wisdom and providence that can only be perceived subjectively by that individual and that individual alone without any bearing whatsoever on the nature of external imperatives or other individuals' movements of resignation and faith. Thus in philosophical theory, Kierkegaard maintains that—even for the briefest moments in time—one's subjective experience supercedes universal ethics and thus the individual becomes from time to time proactively responsible for the nature of her or his existence. Nietzsche upholds subjectivity in philosophical theory by deconstructing historically documented and socially prevalent systems of theological thought that serve to limit the individualistic potential of solitary people. Kierkegaard upholds subjectivity as the one crucial determinant for individuals combating paradoxical issues of faith by virtue of the absurd and their intimate relationship to the Absolute. Nietzsche's world is a dark and bleak shadow that only individuals can potentially, proactively pierce through the will to intellectual power. Kierkegaard's knight of faith is a solitary individual who suffers anxiety and trembling as long as he is functioning bravely alone and outside of sectarian universality. Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard uphold the important of subjectivity, even if they differ on the supportive or deleterious definitions they give in regards to the established world order that serves as the theological backdrop for more modern schools of thought. In both thinkers' writing there appears to be an increasingly clear support for the act of existing defining the nature of individualistic essence. Regardless of their intent, the authors of The Gay Science and Fear and Trembling support the basic tenets of modern day existentialism and further magnify the relevance of the individual's subjective perception/judgment of the universe. Works Cited Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling / Repetition. Ed./Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. New Jersey: Princeton, 1983. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974." ...That's a lot of bloody text. There's a shorter version in a chapter of The Things Raven Sees. Believe or not, I do get this. So did a fourteen year old girl, who was infinitely more intelligent and mature than most of the Columbiners in the making there. Swear to God, the girl had a quote from "Beyond Good and Evil" as a signature. I think it was from Jade's pig dude friend (ZING!). (sigh) I really miss you, SoSsy. -Tabris |
Owner of a little nothing company that isn't real, administrator of WOAM, 98% of the posters here, and king of the lesbians.
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| Tabris Macbeth | Jan 9 2007, 12:19 PM Post #2 |
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The Baddest Ass
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On a side note...wow. Actually fit into one post. -Tabris |
Owner of a little nothing company that isn't real, administrator of WOAM, 98% of the posters here, and king of the lesbians.
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| Sweet Raven | Jan 10 2007, 12:44 PM Post #3 |
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Obligationary Goth Chick
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...Am I in Bizzaro World or something? I haven't met one person who would have any idea what the hell you're talking about. Do you really get all that, Tabris? |
| "I think it's...holy water. The tingling sensation means it's working." | |
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| Tabris Macbeth | Jan 12 2007, 12:44 PM Post #4 |
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The Baddest Ass
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Sure. Makes perfect sense. Of course, I'm naturally literate in big wordism, so I have more of an edge than most. -Tabris, just made a new word! |
Owner of a little nothing company that isn't real, administrator of WOAM, 98% of the posters here, and king of the lesbians.
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| Girl Chaser Meiko | Jan 23 2007, 12:19 PM Post #5 |
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Bibliophile and Girl Chaser
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A fourteen year old reading Beyond Good and Evil? Oh my! I must have been at least twenty when I first read it! ~Meiko |
| I am Girl Chaser Meiko! Defender of- Oh, who am I kidding? I'm a young cat lady. | |
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| Tabris Macbeth | Apr 15 2011, 12:35 AM Post #6 |
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The Baddest Ass
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...The hell did I post? My God, I don't recognize that devilishly attractive young man at all! Wow. Did I actually read that at some point? But it's so big and lacks profanity. Well, heck, this oddity deserves to be stickied for the ages! -Tabris |
Owner of a little nothing company that isn't real, administrator of WOAM, 98% of the posters here, and king of the lesbians.
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| Starwind | Apr 15 2011, 01:06 AM Post #7 |
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The drunk-ass sophistic hillbilly
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When you consider whom I have just quoted, it is easy to guess which side I favor. I find it so difficult to have faith in an Absolute-my mind is ever plagued by doubts; I have only two options; God exists or He doesn't; given Occam's Razor (ironically, since Ockham believed God to be the only certain thing), it seems natural to believe that there is no God; and if He does exist, surely it is only by His will that I am mistaken thusly. The concept of Nietzhe's Eternal Recurrence is much more appealing to me; we must each have the fortitude to live our lives as though they are to recur eternally, i.e. to accept life as it is, with all its pains and joys-something to which Kierkegaard also leads us, albeit on a more wildly twisting road. ...Did anything I just say make any sense? |
| I hear it's amazing when the famous purple unicorn pony in flapjaw space with the tuning fork does a raw blink on friendship rock. I need scissors! 61! | |
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| Tabris Macbeth | Apr 15 2011, 02:09 PM Post #8 |
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The Baddest Ass
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Yup. -Tabris |
Owner of a little nothing company that isn't real, administrator of WOAM, 98% of the posters here, and king of the lesbians.
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| Sweet Raven | Apr 15 2011, 02:10 PM Post #9 |
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Obligationary Goth Chick
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..."Yup"? Just "yup"? |
| "I think it's...holy water. The tingling sensation means it's working." | |
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| Tabris Macbeth | Apr 15 2011, 02:12 PM Post #10 |
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The Baddest Ass
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Yup. -Tabris |
Owner of a little nothing company that isn't real, administrator of WOAM, 98% of the posters here, and king of the lesbians.
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| Starwind | May 4 2011, 03:15 PM Post #11 |
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The drunk-ass sophistic hillbilly
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I just realized something-and it is a most astonishing coincidence! You posted on this and made it a sticky while I was reading it! |
| I hear it's amazing when the famous purple unicorn pony in flapjaw space with the tuning fork does a raw blink on friendship rock. I need scissors! 61! | |
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6:12 AM Jul 11