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Magee about Schopenhauer
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Topic Started: Aug 26 2013, 12:17 AM (313 Views)
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Da Magician
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Aug 26 2013, 12:17 AM
Post #1
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the pure empiricist's answer to the basic Cartesian or Lockean question becomes: 'Yes, there is indeed something which is known for certain, and that is that there are experiences. To assert the existence of anything else is to make an inference which cannot be proved. Known reality consists of experience, and experience alone.' Thus a consistently held-to line of empiricist argument leads away from any form of Cartesian dualism — away from a view of the known world as containing two radically different kinds of entity, one physical,the other mental — to a neutral monism, a world in which everything is of one stuff, experience. To say, as has been said so often, that a thorough going empiricism thus leads us inexorably into a thorough-going idealism is false, and misses the point that what it actually leads us to is a nullification of the distinction. If known reality consists of experience alone it is merely a matter of linguistic preference whether we describe it in the language of material objects and scientific concepts or in the language of subjective sense impressions and thoughts. No issue about the nature of reality is at stake, for it is the same reality that is being described in either case: the question is merely which of two ways of talking we find the more serviceable. (This argument constitutes the central thesis of A. J. Ayer's The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.) This step leads only too easily to the removal from philosophy of the age-old argument about the nature of the world, and its replacement by discussion of alternative ways of describing experience — and this is indeed the way empirical philosophy has developed in the twentieth century.
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Da Magician
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Aug 29 2013, 10:18 PM
Post #2
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Simply delicious, the wonderful discussion, posting this quote elsewhere generated.....! I have found, apparently, that Hume denied the self, and so did Russel and so did Wittgenstein. Their alleged argument (I say alleged, for quotes presented in the cyberspace are not to be credited without further exercise of clarification), being a series of false analogies; example - that claiming that one can experience the self, is like claiming that an arrow can shoot itself.... The absurdity is such that I can only laugh at the idiocy. One experiences the self; such is irrefutable. The self is the experience of the experiencer experiencing. That is, self and experience are one. Dimensions of perception within the singularity.
This being an intertextual experience, I shall proceed to place the link of the discussion: It has been lengthy; I started that thread moths ago, with another, albeit related subject - the impossibility of ontological facts.
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Da Magician
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Aug 29 2013, 11:13 PM
Post #3
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Typical post from that thread: Exemplar Eliminative Materialism, negating experience....
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Right, so you dismiss Magee and Hume as 'delusional', Wittgenstein and Russell as idiotic and you hold that the self is: - Quote:
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the experience of an experiencer experiencing
and that: - Quote:
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the experiencer is not outside of experience, nor is it a mechanism of experience, the experiencer is identical to experience; self=experiencing.
No, that's Descartes' error; all you can really say is an experience happened then another then another, you, in your position, have no mechanism to link them and even if you did, then attempting to experience an experience fails because you can't experience both at once.
that makes no sense, furthermore, I am not looking for any mechanism; that's why you understand nothing - you do not even understand the ambit of the discussion. - Quote:
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You need something to unify all this and you can't have it because of your other commitments. Meanwhile you are introspecting, not as a sceptic, but as a person with all the tools of a non sceptic and assuming that informs your position. You actually need to think through what tools a real sceptic would have at their disposal. You just don't get that at all. Sorry. I'll just keep throwing up quotes from great philosophers who have got it explaining your problem and you can keep saying they are dumb. There's none so blind...
more incoherent nonsense - Quote:
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So, how about Kant: - Kant
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Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances.'
Critique of Pure Reason, A 107 So, deluded? idiotic? or perhaps a pause for reflection?
He is certainly confused; the self is indeed experienced as 'abiding and fixed' in the sense of it being a continuous perception of 'selfhood'; it varying in character and manifestation is a very different thing altogether.
All I can say is:
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Da Magician
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Aug 29 2013, 11:17 PM
Post #4
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The following quote actually preceded the previous... but it isn't as if such matters in the universe of intertextuality...
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So here's the thing: FDB is claiming that all these experiences are had by a subject, a self and that this self is itself experienced.
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yes
Just remember that. And Russell and Nagel and Wittgenstein? Don't you have just the faintest concern that all of these outstanding philosophers are united in agreement on this point?
No; not even a whiff of concern... that's an incorrect analogy: the experiencer is not outside of experience, nor is it a mechanism of experience, the experiencer is identical to experience; self=experiencing. Nonsense... - Quote:
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BTW here's the Russell and Wittgenstein quotes as you seem to have overlooked them: The Problems of Philosophy, page 19. - Wittgenstein
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5.631
The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing.
If I wrote a book "The world as I found it", I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made.
5.632
The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world
5.633
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight.
But you do not really see the eye.
And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.
I suppose that they are both delusional too?
Yes; but I think 'idiotic' captures it better. - Quote:
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The self cannot be an experience of the self any more than an arrow can be targetted at itself. (Which is a paraphrase of Ryle from his Chapter 'The systematic elusiveness of I') Guess what he thinks...
nonsense; more fake analogies...
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Da Magician
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Aug 29 2013, 11:20 PM
Post #5
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The problem seems to be one of incapacity to comprehend that the limit of discussion is epistemological: The ontologically prone mind refuses to let go of the requirement of certainty.
+Certaintyvores" I call them: Rabid creatures wanting to be fed.... attacking anyone who tells them their need is not of nourishment, but an addiction...
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Da Magician
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Aug 29 2013, 11:22 PM
Post #6
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Fuge-de-Bach = Da Magician Subsymbolic = Da Academician
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Da Magician
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Aug 29 2013, 11:36 PM
Post #7
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Behold, the academic mind in all its splendor:
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that makes no sense, furthermore, I am not looking for any mechanism; that's why you understand nothing - you do not even understand the ambit of the discussion.
you may not be looking for one, a mechanism, a way, a strategy, whatever, you need one and you can't have one. - Quote:
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more incoherent nonsense
No, just philosophy you don't understand. - Quote:
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He is certainly confused; the self is indeed experienced as 'abiding and fixed' in the sense of it being a continuous perception of 'selfhood'; it varying in character and manifestation is a very different thing altogether.
So, so you dismiss Magee and Hume as 'delusional', Wittgenstein and Russell as 'idiotic' and 'Kant' as confused, because they all say you are wrong. Your hubris is quite breathtaking.
Problem with the academic minds is well illustrated by the myth of the Pharisees meeting Jesus: An academic mind understand that which is dead; in doesn't understand life. Indeed, it can not conceive that the ambit of its study might have any living representative, as those which it would classify as 'alive' are mirrors of the past, lacking any sort of vital originality.
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Da Magician
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Aug 29 2013, 11:54 PM
Post #8
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The Wise Hermit thus spoke, in regards to these matters under discussion:
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I am really not sure about the direction this discussion is taking. While there may be issues (I would say there are issues) with leaving the self intact, the definition FDB uses of the self as a perception is not a cartesian dualism. It isn't a separate stuff. In fact, it is basically undefined. The idea that it needs a definition is dualistic in the context of this discussion. It requires thinking of self as a thing. If there are things, there is dualism, the knower and the known. If he gave it a list of attributes and claimed it could go off by itself and sit atop a marble throne 6 cubits high and its blazing green eyes would stare piercingly across the domain of souls or something then you would have a point. You are asking him to go down the same road the major philosophers took and wrestle with the problems they decided were important. I think FDB has adequately sidestepped the issue because it really is an ontological question. Who knows what the self is? We can only know what we perceive and then attempt to model those perceptions. Don't get ahead of yourself. The models are all models. And as such, they are all wrong in the same way. They are extractions of finity from an infinite backdrop with which we hope to model well enough to fill in the blanks in our perception with modeled information. We may understand refraction but spear fishing from above still takes practice. We cannot tell for certain if a stick is straight without taking it out of the water at which point, we can perceive to a tolerance level which we can use to predict and manipulate. Until then, we just know that water refracts and that our perception of a bent stick might not be adequately examined, we may not have enough information to use the perceived shape in a larger system.
It really doesn't matter what David Hume thought in this case. FDB is not wrestling with the same issue. While knowledge of how other philosophers have addressed this sort of problem may be advantageous in some cases, it is not necessary nor is it beneficial other than in the very unlikely case that the exact same argument has been made elsewhere. Similar is not exact. Our modeling techniques rely on fuzzy edges. That can be a hindrance in many cases. Categories often seem like individual cases but they aren't.
My friend is wise; pity he refuses to join the cause....
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Da Magician
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Aug 30 2013, 12:01 AM
Post #9
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- mood2;488702
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It's an interesting point about The Self. The way I see it is that a sense of self is an experience, it's what we call the unified way experience is experienced. So there's the experiencing of an image of a red rose, almost instantly followed by memories of red/rose, almost instantly followed by a sound, an emotion, an itch, a thought 'pretty' and so on. It all feels seamless and located in a single pov with a single narrative through time -a subject. And 'Self' is a way of describing that.
indeed... the experience of an experiencer experiencing
yep :).
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Da Magician
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Aug 30 2013, 08:41 AM
Post #10
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The Wise Hermit wrote:
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Maybe it wasn't. But I have a sort of special place in my schematic for Francis Bacon and think that any sort of label falls flat or obscures more than it enlightens regarding his work. He was certainly followed by empiricism and he was very much a product of his times, but his ideas were highly original and when he put them to paper, the western model, paradigm, whatever, changed and we are still feeling the repercussions of that. What he wrote does have tendencies in various places to various sentimentalities but it was and still is too original to think of as a link in a chain. What our culture took from him was an ideal, a point of view. The Baconian/Scientific method was a gigantic achievement of creative thinking but it was a footnote to his deeper idea which was that nature could be decoded and that the benefit of doing so belonged to all humanity. That a society which made learning through his methodology a priority would produce justice as a byproduct. And he was right imo. He wasn't a mechanist or a vitalist or really even an empiricist in some ways although he reflected at various points all of them. He was a follower of ideas wherever they led. And good ideas almost always synthesize whatever they draw from.
Dismissing a school of thought, any school of thought, as a singular entity is the most supreme ignorance a human can produce. To dismiss religion because it's parables fail to fit the modern paradigm, a philosophy because some element within it contradicts one you might prefer, a political platform because the public face looks batshit crazy, or any other complex set of ideas because the labels seem to contradict is ignorance and worse. It promotes and perpetuates ignorance.
Imagine me saying that the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn was irreconcilable with the philosophy of Karl Popper because they belonged to different schools. You would rightly laugh and ridicule me for being so blatantly simple-minded. Not that I would make such a stupid blunder and failure of imagination but the point is illustrated well in this thread. You must be wrong because kant, hume, descartes, wittgenstein. No. That has no bearing on whether or not your proposition in the op is consistent on its own or not. But that is how many people argue. Everything is aha! and superiority of knowledge and endzone dancing.
In many cases I wouldn;t have responded at all to a comment like yours but Bacon is kind of sacred to me. His ideas were revolutionary, original, brilliant, and other things like that, but they were not categorizable by ism.
I'd go on but it would be miserable to read so I'll stop here.
And his words went into the -------->
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Da Magician
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Aug 30 2013, 06:14 PM
Post #11
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- FUGUE-DE-BACH;488887
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I just got the disconnect. It takes a slight but definite shift in how we model externalities to integrate the consequence of experiencing thought on the same tally board as all experience.
FDB, there is the fulcrum issue. Now go write your book about it.
Regarding that, the pressing 'issue' seems to be, once that conclusion is reached, how to distinguish between experiential fact and experience of a falsehood, as both are thoughts, and therefore experiences.
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One thing I have had a difficult time getting from him is his formulation of the relationship of time to experience.
Time is the experience of periodic change in the form of the contents of experience.
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Da Magician
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Aug 30 2013, 06:15 PM
Post #12
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- mood2;488884
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Direct/indirect knowledge is not a problem unless you import from materialism the belief that sensory type experiencing (seeing, feeling, smelling, pain, etc) is more than a different flavour of experiencing to memory, thought, prediction, rationalising, inferring, imagining, modellingetc. It's all directly known.
Once you shake off materialist baggage, apply strict epistemological scepticism and stop treating perception as some special category of experiencing you have to accept that everything we call 'mental' is what is directly known (can't be mistaken). So there's no reason that the experiencing of the act of say inferring or modelling should be put in a different category to the experiencing of smelling a rose.
It's really not difficult once you strip away the inferred materialist baggage, you just have to be able to spot it.
Likewise the experiencing of a sense of self, that's just how it works, as is self evident. Doesn't mean there's a separate/embodied thing called a self, that's inference. It's simply a way of the describing the phenomenology of experiencing, that's the way experiencing is experienced. That's known directly, because that's what experiencing is like.
That's the foundational stuff.
Fig has gone a step further in creating a different framework for expressing this which seems to fit better (imo) than traditional ones. A monism of experiencing if you like (as I understand it), because that's the entirety of reality as it's experienced, and if there's a reality which isn't experienced it's unknowable and irrelevant.
For me personally, acting as if experiencing is related to an external reality works just as well and amounts to the same thing, it's just not a formal philosophical framework.
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Da Magician
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Aug 30 2013, 08:24 PM
Post #13
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This thread is making me feel like a Talmud...
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Direct experience indeed!
Right. This is the quote I was looking for. FDB has never made anything like this claim: we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our Self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.
In fact, creating a theorem from his axiom should lead to the idea that the sense of self is hardly ever experienced in terms of a percentage of the total assuming that perception is limited to some sort of information throughput rate.
Yes he would, here he is saying much the same: - FDB
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One experiences the self; such is irrefutable. The self is the experience of the experiencer experiencing. That is, self and experience are one. Dimensions of perception within the singularity.
In fact, I'm pretty sure that he'd happily accept that your Hume quote is in line with his position. Well, not now I've said he would of course, but... Either way, it's worth quoting just for the line 'dimensions within the singularity'... However, I'd say that he has to commit to that, because he wants to assert that every experience is experienced by a self and that means that the self has to be directly experienced all of the time otherwise how could you experience each experience as your experience rather than just an experience? Without indirect experience that binding has to occur in direct experience thus an experience of the self experiencing the experience has to be the nature of the experience.
you are using the wrong arithmetic to interpret his formulas. He is saying that a sense of self happens and that the statement is irrefutable. He is saying that it may happen at any moment (or not) and that if you wish to name the source of sense perception 'self' you are free to do so as you wish because it is a name. Names are words. Have fun with them. Nowhere is he saying that there is anything immutable about the source of that sense. Nowhere is he saying that we have any way to know what lies beyond the sense. In fact, he is saying the opposite. He is saying that such a sense happens with some regularity entirely without qualification. You are the one trying to figure out where on the map this self belongs. He is saying that maps are what we get through experience but they can only be reduced to the experiences which filled in the parts that were filled in through experience. The rest is for convenience. I agree with that. This idea that mapping physical changes produces knowledge of a deeper reality is in error I believe. Maps are what prevent us from seeing by condensing experience into discrete units. They create finity which is simply how we have found ourselves. A map of maps may get us out of the hole but a map of physical change is what keeps us in it.
excellent development ------------------------------
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Da Magician
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Sep 5 2013, 02:05 PM
Post #14
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mood2
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The problem is only a problem when you mistake model for reality.
No the problem is in positing an epistemology that does not allow for you to know that the model is the reality. If you define what you can know as only that which you experience, you're epistemologically dead in the water, because the subjective experience of a model is only true in an objective sense. The "sense of self" (or whatever we want to call it) has no capacity to know that it is not experiencing reality; that it is only experiencing a model of reality. It may be able to assume it or infer it, perhaps, but it can't know it. That it is an objective fact that it is a model in a model is a metaphysical, ontological statement that figs' "sense of self" can't make. Indeed, saying "sense of self" is an ontological statement, however incomplete or incoherent.
If you get rid of the notion of a Self-Thing, an It (noun), you're left with just the experiencing. Materialism makes us think you can't have a verb (experiencing) without a noun (experiencer), our materialist semantics work that way too, and it's the only language we have, which makes it a difficult conceptual leap. But if we're not assuming materialism, then there's no need or warrant for assuming a Self-Thing. There's only what is known - experiencing. So we don't know there's a Self-Thing which models experiences, what we know is that there's experiencing - experiencing sensations, experiencing emotions and experiencing remembering and experiencing thinking etc. Including experiencing stories (models) and experiencing reflecting on experiencing, and experiencing predicting and subsequent experiencing which fits or doesn't with the predicting and leads to new stories. And the form this experiencing takes has a feeling of unity and coherence centred in a specific pov moving through time. IOW a sense of self. That's what is directly experienced/known.
mood is good....
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